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Abstract  
 
Biological brains are increasingly cast as ‘prediction machines’: evolved organs 
whose core operating principle is to learn about the world by trying to predict 
their own patterns of sensory stimulation. This, some argue, should lead us to 
embrace a brain-bound ‘neurocentric’ vision of the mind. The mind, such views 
suggest, consists entirely in the skull-bound activity of the predictive brain. In 
this paper I reject the inference from predictive brains to skull-bound minds. 
Predictive brains, I hope to show, can be apt participants in larger cognitive 
circuits. The path is thus cleared for a new synthesis in which predictive brains 
act as entry-points for ‘extended minds’, and embodiment and action 
contribute constitutively to knowing contact with the world. 
 
 
1. Predictive Processing 
 
The vision of the brain as a biological engine of prediction is steadily gaining 
ground (Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Andy Clark, 2013; K. Friston, 
2005, 2010; Hohwy, 2013). Brains, this emerging vision suggests, are 
fundamentally prediction-error minimizing devices. Prediction error, in these 
treatments, signals the mismatch between incoming sensory stimulation and 
complex, multi-area downward flows of neuronal activity. Brains like these are 
complex self-organizing systems that alter and change so as actively to predict 
the incoming sensory barrage. This is not, for the most part, a matter of trying 
to look into the future! Instead, such systems are constantly trying to guess the 
present: they are trying to self-generate (‘from the top down’) the sensory 
streams that are currently arriving from the world. Call this general strategy  
‘engaging in the prediction task’.  
 
The prediction task is computationally important because it opens the door to 
powerful forms of unsupervised learning. A system that initially knows nothing 
(or very little1) about its world can still progressively alter its own structure so 
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as to meet incoming sensory signals with increasingly apt flows of top-down 
prediction. It does this by automatically altering so as to reduce future 
mismatches between input and the top-down flow. This process (which can be 
implemented by various well-understood algorithms2) slowly installs a kind of 
statistical model of the most likely ways in which sensory inputs will change 
and evolve. Such models are often tracking distal causes. If you see (sense) the 
flash of lightning and have learnt to expect the distinctive auditory sensory 
barrage caused by thunder, your statistical model works because it is tracking a 
regularity in the distal environment. If you hear a noun and expect a verb, your 
statistical model works because it is tracking a regularity in the linguistic 
environment. In a variety of simulation studies it has been shown that self-
organizing around the prediction task enables systems that start with little or no 
grip on such regularities to gain such a grip3.  
 
Such systems learn about the shape of the distal environment by using some of 
their states (the flows of downward prediction) to predict the evolving shape of 
others (ultimately, states of their own sensory surfaces). When such guessing 
games are conducted systematically, using multi-level architectures in which 
each level is trying to guess (predict) the activity at the level below, the results 
are impressive4. Each higher level learns to predict the activity at the level 
below by learning about different kinds of structure in that activity – structure 
that, layer-by-layer, reaches back to the structure of perturbations at the sensory 
surfaces. In this way, they come to make increasingly ‘educated guesses’ about 
the world - the distal structures that are the source of those patterned input 
signals. Exposed only to raw sensory stimulations, hierarchical predictive 
learning regimes thus deliver a grip upon complex structures of interacting 
distal causes (structures of ‘hidden causes’ or ‘latent variables’) as the most 
efficient means of predicting future plays of energy across the sensorium.  
 
Potent regimes of prediction-driven learning, these stories suggest, enable 
brains like ours to learn about what’s out there by finding the best ways to 
predict the incoming sensory barrage using linked bodies of acquired 
probabilistic knowledge. Linked bodies of probabilistic knowledge capable of 
performing this feat are known as ‘generative models’ (see e.g (Hinton, 2007)) 
because they are able to re-create the incoming sensory patterns ‘from the top-
down’. Exposed to certain streams of auditory information, such systems might 
learn about words, phrases, nouns, verbs, and sentences. Exposed to certain 
streams of visual information, they might learn about basic and more complex 
structures found in natural scenes (lines, edges, stripes, and ultimately whole 
objects). Exposed to certain streams of proprioceptive and interoceptive 
information, they might (Seth, 2013) learn about the shapes, structures, and 
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capabilities of their own bodies. Prediction-driven learning thus provides a 
mechanistically tractable means of learning about the distal world on the basis 
of nothing more than the shifting patterns of raw energies registered by the 
sensory transducers. When a well-trained system later encounters (or brings 
forth –see below) a pattern of sensory stimulation, it tries to match that pattern 
using what it has learnt to generate a flow of top-down prediction. Mismatches 
between what is predicted and what is currently registered at the sensory 
surfaces yield prediction errors, and those prediction errors are used to nuance 
the ongoing process of multi-level top-down guessing until an acceptable 
match (corresponding to a reasonable percept) is achieved. In such ‘predictive 
processing’ (PP), or ‘prediction error minimizing (PEM5), regimes incoming 
sensory signals are met using a rich suite of knowledge and expectation whose 
content and deployment is controlled by (different time-scale) processes of 
prediction-error minimization. These processes minimize the difference 
between what is predicted and the sensory input as it is registered by 
(ultimately) the plays of energy across the sensory surfaces (for introductions, 
see (Andy Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013)). 
 
The PP (Predictive Processing) story is powerful and progressive. It accounts 
for a wide variety of observed effects and reveals complex inter-relations 
between core cognitive phenomena such as attention, learning, perception, 
action, and cognition6. It appears increasingly likely that PP routines pervade 
human cognition, and that it is the systematic pursuit of apt top-down 
prediction that installs, in brains like ours, richly structured suites of knowledge 
concerning the wider world. If these ambitious accounts are on track the 
ongoing attempt to meet the incoming sensory stream with matching patterns 
of top-down activation provides both the core mechanism responsible for 
bringing a structured external reality ‘into view’ in the first place and the means 
by which ongoing perceptual experience is itself constructed.  
 
 
2. The Bounds of Sense 
 
Prediction error minimization takes place behind what (Hohwy, 2013, 2014) 
terms an ‘evidentiary boundary’. In one sense, this is clearly true. Prediction 
error is minimized, ultimately, for the plays of stimulation that occur (or are 
actively brought forth) at the sensory surfaces, wherever they may be. That 
marks a boundary – though it need not mark a boundary that is unique or 
immutable, as we shall later see. In addition, Howhy (e.g. (Hohwy, 2013) p.239) 
speaks of these systems as seeking the ‘hypotheses’ that best explain the 
sensory data. This too is true – but only (as I hope to show) on a relatively 
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weak reading of the term ‘hypothesis’. This will prove important as we seek to 
uncover the deeper implications of the PP/PEM story. 
 
The predicting brain seems to be in somewhat the same predicament as the 
imprisoned agents in Plato’s “allegory of the cave” (Plato. & Jowett, 1941). 
Plato imagines agents chained to a wall, able to see only the shadows cast as 
events unfold in front of a flickering fire. The imprisoned cave-dwellers are 
thus unable to directly perceive events in the world, and must instead guess at 
the world on the basis of the distorted shadows. Similarly, Hohwy argues, the 
biological brain/central nervous system must constantly infer the shape and 
structure of the distal realm on the basis of the partial and fragmentary 
information available in the sensory signal. 
 
The cave-dwellers are, notably, prisoners in the cave – they are chained to the 
walls, unable to intervene in the scenes they are watching. Human agents, by 
contrast, can act upon the world in ways that test their hypotheses – for 
example, we may saccade to the locations where we expect to find salient visual 
information given that we think we are engaging in face-to-face conversation. If 
we find the kind of information we expect (e.g. flows of information from the 
eye and face regions indicating changing emotional states) that supports the 
‘face-to-face conversation’ hypothesis. If we do not, we may have to seek a new 
hypothesis (perhaps I mistook a showroom dummy for a real agent). By 
actively interrogating the world, we thus put our hypotheses to the test7. 
 
It might be thought that this makes all the difference. But as (Hohwy, 2014) 
also notes, the mere availability of action does not materially alter the epistemic 
situation for the predictive brain. For action itself, according to the PP class of 
models, is best understood as a means of minimizing prediction error. In action, 
prediction error is minimized not by altering our hypotheses about the world, 
but by altering the world so as to make it conform to our predictions. The idea 
here (see (K. J. Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010; K. Friston, 2009) is 
that action is brought about by proprioceptive prediction. The brain predicts 
the flow of proprioceptive consequences that would obtain were a certain 
action undertaken, and by minimizing the ensuing cascade of prediction errors, 
actually brings the action about. This is achieved, ultimately, by a process 
involving stretch receptors in the muscles, and orchestrated via the dorsal horn 
of the spinal cord. The point to notice here is that the process that produces 
the action is (if this story is correct) just another instance of sensory prediction 
error minimization. The error signal that drives the flow of motor action is 
simply the difference between current and predicted proprioceptive signals. 
These signals track states of the body, just as other sensory signals track states 
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of the world. But the body itself is ‘known’ only via those (and other) sensory 
signals. So here too, Howhy argues, we encounter the evidentiary boundary. A 
symptom of this is that as long as the flow of sensory information remains the 
same, the perceived world (the world insofar as it can be known to the agent) 
must remain the same.  
 
Our agentive access to the world is thus bounded by the prediction error 
minimizing routine as it is applied to the flow of interoceptive, exteroceptive, 
and proprioceptive signals. The upshot, according to Hohwy, is a firm and 
neurocentric boundary. The PP model, Hohwy concludes: 
 
“..tells us how neurocentric we should be: the mind begins where 
sensory input is delivered through exteroceptive, proprioceptive and 
interoceptive receptors and ends where proprioceptive predictions are 
delivered, mainly in the spinal cord.” (Hohwy, 2014) p. 18 
 
It is for this reason that PP/PEM, as Hohwy constructs it, is claimed to be 
inimical to many of the core claims associated with recent work on the 
embodied mind. Thus we read that: 
 
“PEM should make us resist conceptions of [the mind-world] relation 
on which the mind is in some fundamental way porous to the world, or 
viewed as embodied, extended or enactive. Instead, the mind appears to 
be secluded from the world, it seems to be more neurocentrically skull-
bound than embodied or extended, and action itself is more an 
inferential process on sensory input than enactive coupling with the 
body and environment” (Hohwy, 2014) p. 1 
 
In the next several sections (sections 3-6) I cast doubt upon this neurocentric 
reconstruction before proceeding (sections 7-9) to describe and motivate an 
alternative vision. 
 
 
3. The Ambiguous Appeal to Inference 
 
Howhy (Hohwy, 2013) pp. 219-221, (Hohwy, 2014)) offers a variety of 
interlocking considerations meant to support the vision of a secluded, 
neurocentric mind. The first, and simplest, is the observation (section 2 above) 
that prediction error minimizing routines are defined over sensory signals so 
that “from inside the skull the brain has to infer the hidden causes of its 
sensory input” ((Hohwy, 2013) p.220). The second ties that observation to a 
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traditional form of skeptical threat, and argues that such openness to 
skepticism is diagnostic of a more traditional (‘disembodied’) account of mind. 
The third highlights the presence and importance of an ‘explanatory-evidential 
circle’ and argues that this forces us to define a firm evidentiary boundary 
behind which ‘the mind’ operates.  
 
As will become apparent, these three arguments are all variants on a single 
theme, and as such the boundaries between them are not always clear. That 
theme is one of inferential seclusion – the mind, it is argued, is that which 
operates behind the veil of transduced sensory information, inferring complex 
hidden causes as the best explanation of changing (and partially self-induced) 
patterns of sensory stimulation. There is (as we shall see) a certain sense in 
which this is correct. But it is important not to over-intellectualize either this 
process, or the hidden causes themselves. In a wide range of cases, the process 
that Hohwy describes as one of secluded inference delivers nothing other than 
an implementation of the kinds of closely coupled perception-action routine 
highlighted by work on the embodied mind. And these closely-coupled routines 
provide a kind of step-ladder, I shall later argue, to various kinds of cognitive 
extension – a step-ladder to what (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) dubbed ‘the 
extended mind’.  
 
Thus consider the first, and most basic, of the arguments mentioned above. 
This argument points to the role of the brain as a probabilistically-inflected 
inference engine, constantly attempting to meet the incoming sensory barrage 
with a stream of matching downwards predictions. According to Hohwy, the 
operation of such a process induces a disconnect between the mind and the 
world as it is modeled by the mind. The result is said to be: 
 
 “a schism between the prediction-generating models of the brain and 
the modeled states of affairs in the world”  
 
By contrast, Howhy adds: 
 
 “Views of mind and cognition that emphasize openness, embodiment, 
and active extension into the environment seem to be biased against this 
inferential conception of the mind” Both quotes from (Hohwy, 2014) 
p.5. 
 
Such views are not, of course, biased against the (surely unassailable) claim that 
something important is being done by the brain when agents engage their worlds 
in the kinds of ways distinctive of flexible, adaptive, intelligent response. So 
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where might the putative tension lie? It lies in the notion, repeatedly stressed by 
Hohwy, that what the brain does is best construed as a form of inference. But 
here we need to be very careful indeed. For the notion of inference in play here 
is actually far less demanding than it initially appears. 
 
To see this, consider what was at issue in early debates concerning vision and 
the embodied mind. Here: 
 
“The key insight… is that the task of vision is not to build rich inner 
models of a surrounding 3-D reality, but rather to use visual information 
efficiently and cheaply in the service of real-world, real-time action. 
Researchers in animate and interactive vision thus reject what 
Churchland et al [1994] dub the paradigm of ‘pure vision’ – the 
idea…that vision is largely a means of creating a world model rich 
enough to let us ‘throw the world away’, allowing reason and thought to 
be focused upon the inner model instead.” (Clark, 1999) p.345 
 
The alternative – pursued by successful research programs in ‘active 
perception’– is to use sensing as a channel allowing us to lock-on to simple 
invariants in the sensory flow8. Used in this way, sensing delivers an action-
based grip upon the world, rather than a neutral reconstruction apt for detached 
reasoning.  Such a grip may intrinsically involve organismic action, as when (to 
rehearse a familiar case) the baseball outfielder runs so as to keep the image of 
the ball stationary on the retina. By thus acting in ways that continuously cancel 
out any apparent optical acceleration, she ensures (Fink, Foo, & Warren, 2009) 
that she will be in a position to catch the ball when it descends towards the 
pitch. In such cases, behavioral success is not the outcome of reasoning defined 
over a kind of inner replica of the external world. Rather, it is the outcome of 
perception/action cycles that operate by keeping sensory stimulations within 
certain bounds. This is the same kind of strategy celebrated by work in 
ecological psychology showing, for example, how some diving seabirds 
(gannets) predict time-to-impact according to the relative rate of expansion of 
the image in the optic array - see (Lee & Reddish, 1981) and discussion in 
(Tresilian, 1999). What matters for present purposes is that these kinds of 
strategy are non-reconstructive. They do not use sensing, moment-by-moment, to 
build an inner model that recapitulates the structure and richness of the real-
world, and that is thus able to stand-in for that world for the purposes of 
planning, reasoning, and the guidance of action. Instead, here-and-now 
behavior is enabled by using sensing in the special way described above – as a 
channel to enable the organism to co-ordinate its behaviors with select aspects of 
the distal environment.  
	   8	  
 
Such non-reconstructive roles for perception are typically cast in bald 
opposition to the inferential, secluded vision. Thus, in an important recent 
treatment, Michael Anderson describes non-reconstructive approaches as an 
alternative to mainstream (inferential and reconstructive) approaches in which 
perception is cast as analogous to scientific inference and in which: 
 
“from incomplete and fragmentary data, one generates hypotheses (or 
models) for the true nature of the world, which are then tested against 
and modified in light of further incoming sensory stimulation.” (M L 
Anderson, 2014) p.164 
 
These traditional approaches, Anderson continues, depict cognition as “post-
perceptual…...representation-rich, and deeply decoupled from the 
environment”. Importantly, Anderson suggest that this follows because, on the 
traditional accounts he has in mind: 
 
“reconstructed representations are what the system fundamentally has to 
work with; the world, once sieved through our senses, simply provides 
insufficient information about itself. Our understanding of the nature of 
the epistemic problem that must be solved, then, drives us to 
hypothesize a particular kind of….solution” (M L Anderson, 2014) p. 
164 
 
Non-reconstructive accounts of the role of sensing, Anderson argues, suggest a 
viable alternative and one that significantly alters our understanding of our own 
epistemic situation. Instead of engaging the world on the basis of a rich inner 
model constructed behind the closed doors of sensing, these non-
reconstructive solutions show how to achieve behavioral goals by maintaining a 
delicate dance between sensing and action.  
 
One signature of this kind of grip-based non-reconstructive dance is that it 
suggests a reversal of our ordinary way of thinking about the relations between 
perception and action. Instead of seeing perception as the control of action, it 
becomes fruitful to think of action as the control of perception (Powers (2005)). 
Thus (re)-conceived, the problem is: 
 
 “not…choosing the right response in light of a given stimulus 
but…choosing the right stimulus in light of a given goal” (Anderson, 
2014) p.182-3).  
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In other words, it becomes fruitful to see the outfielder (or diving gannet) as 
running (or diving) in ways that maintain a signature kind of sensory state or 
flow.  
 
But, as Hohwy himself correctly notes, there is absolutely nothing in the 
PP/PEM vision that conflicts either with this vision of actions whose role is to 
harvest perceptions, or (more generally) with the idea of non-reconstructive 
strategies as one means of promoting behavioral success. Such strategies are, in 
fact, very naturally accommodated since the best ways to minimize long-term 
prediction error will often be action-involving, and since there is an in-built 
premium upon simpler, more efficient solutions. Thus we read that: 
 
“It is a mistake to think that just because the brain only does inference, it 
must build up its internal model like it was a following a sober physics 
textbook. As long as prediction error is minimized on average and over 
the long run, it doesn’t matter which model is doing it. For this reason a 
model that predicts linear optical trajectories is entirely feasible and can 
easily be preferable to a more cumbersome series of computations. This 
is particularly so if it is a less complex model, with fewer parameters, 
since prediction error in the long run is helped by minimal complexity.” 
(Hohwy, 2014) p.20 
 
This is revealing. Hohwy here (and elsewhere9 ) concedes that often, the 
PP/PEM framework will indeed stand opposed to more ‘intellectualist’  
frameworks that depict moment-by-moment behavioral success as the product 
of inferences defined over rich internal models whose role is to allow us to 
‘throw away the world’. Instead, the role of the inner model is, in very many 
daily settings, to spot help spot the contexts in which some more frugal, action-
dependent, procedure will work (we return to this hybrid picture in sections 7-9 
below – see also Clark (2016)). This means that ‘inference’, as it functions in 
the PP/PEM story, is not necessarily defined over internal states that bear 
richly reconstructive, or symbolic, or propositional contents. It is not defined, 
in other words, over the contents of an inner realm compelled to stand in for 
the full richness of the external world. Instead, inference may deliver strategies 
whose unfolding and success depend delicately and continuously upon the 
structure and ongoing contributions of the external realm, as exploited by 
action, intervention, and the varying distribution of attention. 
 
Hohwy frequently speaks of neuronal systems as seeking out the hypotheses that 
best explain the sensory information. But it would be more accurate to describe 
prediction error minimization as a process that finds the multilevel set of 
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neuronal states that best accommodate (as I will now put it) the current sensory 
barrage. This is preferable to talk of ‘finding the right hypothesis’ as such talk 
brings unwanted and potentially misleading ‘reconstructive baggage’. 
Accommodating the current sensory barrage may take many forms, some of 
which involve low-cost methods of selecting actions that re-shape the sensory 
signal or maintain it within pre-set bounds. Accommodating the incoming 
signal thus need not (though it sometimes may) imply settling upon an action-
neutral description of the external situation, nor need it imply finding a 
proposition or set of propositions that best describes or predicts that incoming 
signals. The task of PP systems is not to infer the best description of the world 
given the sensory evidence. The fundamental task, using prediction errors as 
the lever, is to find the neuronal activity patterns that most successfully 
accommodate (in action, and in readiness for action) current sensory states.  
 
4. Evil Demons (Red Herrings) 
 
Why does Hohwy, despite stressing the importance of a ‘non-intellectualist’ 
reading of PP/PEM, insist that it promotes a neurocentric, secluded vision of 
the mind? The reason seems to be that Hohwy links the secluded, inferential 
vision to something quite different and (I shall argue) rather alien to much of 
the discussion in hands-on embodied cognitive science. He links it to the mere 
possibility of global skepticsm. It is this mere possibility that, in Hohwy’s 
treatment, suffices to establish a robust  ‘veil of tranduction’ which positions 
the world on the far side of an important, agent-impermeable, evidentiary 
boundary.  
 
Thus, in response to the suggestion that PP/PEM is consistent with (and 
indeed actively predicts) the use of fast and frugal strategies that use sensing in 
the special way described above, Hohwy writes that: 
 
“..the incoming visual signal drives action but…this driving in fact does 
rely on a veil of transduction, namely the evidentiary boundary within 
which there is ample inference, and beyond which lies nothing but 
inferred causes.” (Hohwy, 2014) p.21 
 
To demonstrate this, Hohwy repeatedly invokes the spectre of Cartesian 
skepticism. But this, it seems to me, is a mere distraction (a red herring). The 
skeptical claim is simply the claim that, were the play of sensory stimulations 
being received and (apparently) harvested by the brain to remain fixed, so too 
would our experience of the world. For all we know, then, our physical bodies 
might be hanging immobile in some Matrix-like energy web, kept alive and fed 
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whatever sensory stimulations are required to make it seem as if we are running 
to catch fly-balls, and arguing about the powers of evil demons. But this mere 
possibility (even if it is accepted) in no way casts doubt upon the key claims 
associated with work in embodied cognitive science. Consider running to catch 
the fly-ball. This (in the Matrix/vat) would involve feeding the brain the 
complex, action-sensitive unfolding sensory streams that would normally ensue 
were an embodied agent actually running so as to cancel the optical acceleration 
of the ball. The mere fact that this is what would be required attests, it seems to 
me, to the veracity of the non-reconstructive account of fly-ball interception! 
 
There remains a genuine sense in which the experienced world may be said to be 
constructed by the brain from behind an evidentiary boundary imposed 
(currently at least) by the biological senses. As Hohwy elsewhere puts it: 
 
“What are behind the barrier of sensory input are hidden causes that must 
be inferred. An appeal to action, on the prediction error scheme, reduces 
to an appeal to inferences about different kinds of patterns of sensory 
input. If a mad scientist was a hidden common cause of all that sensory 
input we would have no way of knowing unless she made an 
independent causal contribution to sensory input.” Hohwy (2013) p.220, 
emphasis in original. 
 
The upshot, we are told, is that: 
 
“our grasp of the world – the way we mirror its causal structure – is at 
the mercy of the inferential tools we have internally in the brain” Op Cit, 
p. 221 
 
But the very most that such skeptical challenges could establish would be a very 
different sense of ‘inferential seclusion’ from the one at issue in the debates 
between reconstructive and non-reconstructive approaches to perception and 
action. For those debates (the ones about the shape of the perception-action 
nexus) were not about whether we just might be fooled, by some clever 
manipulation, into misconstruing our own worldly situation. Instead, they were 
about how best to understand, from within our current scientific perspective, 
the role of the sensory stream in enabling apt forms of world-engaging action. 
At issue, as we saw, was the question whether apt actions are always and 
everywhere computed by using sensing to get enough information into the 
system to allow it to plot its response by exploring an internally represented 
recapitulation of the distal world. Non-reconstructive solutions, as the name 
implies, demonstrate the viability of alternative, computationally frugal, but 
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more behaviorally interactive. They do not imply – nor do they seek to imply – 
the falsity of the skeptical hypothesis. That, I suggest, is an orthogonal question 
that demands a full philosophical treatment in its own right10. Instead, non-
reconstructive (broadly speaking ‘ecological’) accounts are a promising move in 
what is first and foremost a very different game - the game of understanding, in 
the light of our best empirical science, the actual role of perception in a wide 
variety of fluent behaviors11.  
 
The image of the mind as secluded behind an inferential curtain is thus itself 
importantly ambiguous. If it means only that the world, insofar as we know and 
experience it, is that which is both specified and engaged by the ongoing flow 
of (partially self-induced) sensory stimulations, then PP/PEM indeed mandates 
a certain kind of seclusion. Though even there, the question of where to place 
the boundaries of sensing themselves – and the question whether well-fitted 
tools and technologies might temporarily or permanently alter the best place to 
place those bounds – arises (see section 4 below). But seclusion, in this rather 
limited sense, does not imply the richly reconstructive model of perception 
according to which our actions are selected by processes of reasoning defined 
over the contents of rich inner models whose role is to replace the external 
world with a kind of inner simulacrum12.  
 
The mere fact that neural processing is organized around prediction error 
minimization routines thus puts no real pressure upon the claim that lies at the 
heart of recent work on the embodied mind. For what that work most 
fundamentally rejects is the richly reconstructive model of perception. The appearance 
of conflict arises from ambiguities in the notions of inference and seclusion 
themselves. For these notions may seem to imply the presence of a rich inner 
recapitulation of the distal environment, with a consequent downgrading of the 
role of action and upgrading of the role of reasoning defined over that inner 
model. Nothing in PP/PEM, however, mandates this. On the contrary, 
PP/PEM strongly suggests that brains like ours will, wherever possible, exploit 
simple strategies that rely heavily on world-engaging action, delivering new 
sensory stimulations just-in-time to support behavioral success. 
 
 
5. Making Space for The Extended Mind. 
 
Hohwy’s argument for a secluded, inferential model of mind trades heavily, it 
seems to me, on the ambiguity between reconstructive and non-reconstructive 
uses of sensing identified in the previous section. Thus consider the following 
passage, which aims to put direct pressure on the idea that human minds might 
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be ‘extended minds’ in the sense of (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). The suggestion 
there was that the true circuits of human cognition might (when certain further 
conditions are met) include operations and storage realized by bio-external 
resources such as a smartphone or even a notebook. I shall not attempt to 
convince the reader of this view here13. What I do hope to show, however, is 
that nothing in the PP/PEM framework should negatively impact the 
arguments already supposed to favour the conclusion that the machinery of 
mind can, sometimes, extend out into the extra-neural world.  
 
Commenting on this issue, Hohwy writes that: 
 
“An agent can grasp and use her phone only because she has a more or 
less precise and accurate internal representation of the phone, the things 
in her drawer that may occlude it, and the causal interactions between 
her fingers, eyes, voice and the states of the phone…..In so far as we can 
interact with things in the environment, including our bodies and other 
people and their mental states, we must be modeling them, forming 
hypotheses about them and their interactions, predicting the next 
sensory input, assessing the prediction error generated and updating the 
hypotheses accordingly. In other words, there is reason to think that 
these states are all hidden causes, situated beyond the evidentiary 
boundary.” Hohwy (2014) p.11 
 
We can now see what is wrong (or at least subtly misleading) with this diagnosis. 
It is correct insofar as (assuming the truth of PP/PEM) the interactions 
between the biological organism and the smartphone are indeed orchestrated 
by bio-internal processes of prediction error minimization. But it is misleading 
to suggest that, moment-by-moment, our fast and fluent uses of the 
smartphone (or any other bio-external resource) require us to command a 
‘precise and accurate internal representation of the phone’. Instead – just as in 
the case of running to catch the fly-ball – what may often be doing the work is 
a kind of perceptually-maintained motor-informational grip on the world: a 
low-cost perception-action routine that retrieves the right information just-in-
time for use, and that is not in the business of building up a rich inner 
simulacrum14.  
 
To see this, reflect that the operations and information stores made available by 
some bio-external resource may become densely woven into a set of learnt 
habits: compiled, easily cued motor routines by means of which the intelligent 
agent deals with her (wider) world. Within such a weave, there is no clock 
governing the brain’s exchanges with the world (it is not the case that all the 
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inner stuff is done at t1, and calls to the world happen at t2). Nor is it the case 
that all the interactions between the biological and bio-external resource are 
launched and routed through the slow, serial bottleneck in which conscious 
attention and/or the agent’s intentions are used to guide deliberate action. 
Instead, as in skilled performance more generally, activity in the brain becomes 
dovetailed with multiple sub-personally orchestrated  ‘calls to the world’ 
accomplished by embodied action. Instead, such cases involve a temporary 
coalition of unfolding internal processes, each of which may directly issue, at 
differing time-scales, calls both to other inner processes and to outward-
looping ‘epistemic acts' that harvest new information, or call upon new 
information-transforming operations, just-in-time to keep the process rolling 
(see (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994)). The brain is not required explicitly to represent the 
availability of such and such information/operations from any given internal or 
external location. Instead, it simply deploys a problem-solving routine whose 
fine structure has been selected (by learning and practice) so as to assume the 
easy availability of such and such information or the easy accomplishment of 
such and such a useful data-transformation, from (for example) such and such 
a visual location via the performance of such-and-such a gross motor action. 
Similarly, when our brains detect a sudden flash and our eyes automatically 
saccade in that direction, the motor routine embodies a kind of unrepresented 
commitment to the effect that we may gain useful (perhaps life-saving) 
information by such a rapid saccade.  
 
The effect of extended problem-solving practice is thus to install a kind of 
motor-informational weave such that repeated calls to bio-external resources  
become built-in to the very heart of many of our daily cognitive routines. But 
to repeat: such calls need not depend on (consciously or unconsciously) 
representing the fact that such-and-such information is available by such-and-
such a motor act.  Applied to the smartphone case, the moral is that to use the 
phone in fluent, semi-automatic ways our brains don’t need to model or 
represent it in any equivalently rich way. So the idea that everything that matters 
about the phone when it is folded into a fluent problem-solving flow is 
exhausted by the way it turns up as an ‘inferred cause’ in my brain’s PGM (thus 
placing it behind the evidentiary boundary imposed by our sensory systems) is 
simply false. 
  
The idea that the phone – in it’s potential role as part of the machinery of 
human cognition - is merely an ‘inferred cause’ hidden behind the evidentiary 
boundary imposed by our sensory systems thus loses its sting. This is not to 
deny that insofar as we experience and understand the phone, that experience and 
understanding constructs the phone as an inferred cause (on a par with tables, 
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chairs, and other minds). But that doesn’t in itself imply that the phone is not – 
also, simultaneously – acting as part of our own ‘extended cognitive 
architecture’. The same is true, after all, of my own brain! Insofar as I know 
about and (perhaps via sophisticated imaging techniques) perceptually 
experience my own brain, that’s because it too has turned up in my model of 
the world, as another ‘inferred cause’ constructed from behind the evidentiary 
veil imposed by the sensory surfaces. But this does not preclude its also 
functioning as part of my cognitive equipment – a part, moreover, that can 
contribute to my cognitive processing in myriad ways that are not exhausted 
(thankfully) by what I know about it. A corollary of this is that the smartphone 
or other bio-external equipment could, in principle, participate in an agent’s 
cognitive processing without that participation being exhausted by, or limited 
by, or moment-by-moment constituted by, what that agent   - or even that 
agent’s entire internal probabilistic generative model -  knows or encodes about 
it. In such cases the bio-external resource participates in a dense, sub-personal, 
motor-informational weave that implements cognitive skills without replicating 
them ‘in the head’. 
 
This highlights something crucial that is often overlooked in discussions of the 
extended mind. It is that sensing, given such a picture, plays two very different 
roles with respect to the smartphone, or any other bio-external resource. 
Sometimes, sensing plays the standard role of enabling an agent to see and 
think about the resource – as when we ask ourselves which model smartphone 
to purchase, and go to the store to examine the leading candidates. At other 
times (once the phone has been assimilated into patterns of fluent, unreflective 
use) it plays a role more like that of an inner information flow within the brain 
– so that an act of sensing is now more like an information transferring relay 
within a larger information processing whole. Plugged into the larger fabric of 
existing arguments in favour of extended cognition all this suggests that 
smartphones and other well-fitted ‘cognitive prosthetics’ can indeed participate 
in episodes of cognitive processing. What seems to matter in these cases is that 
the acts and operations that they make available become intimately sub-
personally dovetailed with the acts and operations provided by neuronal and 
gross-bodily resources, so that it is the whole transient ensemble that is called 
upon, fluently and automatically, in the service of problem-solving success15.  
 
At the very least, we should allow that neural and extra-neural operations can  
become inextricably interwoven within the kinds of skilled intelligent 
commerce most characteristic of human cognitive success. The existence of 
such dense, sub-personal, supra-representational  motor-informational weaves 
should already (independently of arguments for or against  extended cognition) 
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give us sufficient cause to reject the suggestion that PP leads to a secluded, 
disembodied, neurocentric, vision of mind. Or does it? 
 
6. Self-Evidencing Systems 
 
The neurocentric, skull-bound vision of mind also follows, or so (Hohwy, 
2014) argues, from a certain implication of the PP/PEM story. It follows, we 
are told, from the implied vision of the brain as a self-evidencing system. Self-
evidencing (Hempel, 1965) occurs when a hypothesis best explains some piece 
of evidence and, in virtue of that explanatory success, thereby provides 
evidence for its own truth or correctness. In such cases, the occurrence of the 
evidence is best explained by the hypothesis but the fact that the evidence 
occurs at all is used to lend support to the hypothesis itself. To use a common 
example, my lack of study may be offered as an explanation of why I failed the 
exam, while my failing the exam might reasonably be offered as evidence for 
my lack of study. This can sound unacceptably circular. Despite this, we make 
use of such forms of reasoning daily, and in ways that can be quite 
epistemically innocent. Thus Peter Lipton notes that: 
 
“Self-evidencing explanations are common, in part because we often 
infer that a hypothesis is correct precisely because it would, if correct, 
provide a good explanation of the evidence. Seeing the disemboweled 
teddy bear on the floor, with its stuffing strewn throughout the living 
room, I infer that Rex has misbehaved again. Rex's actions provide an 
excellent if discouraging explanation of the scene before me, and this is 
so even though that scene is my only direct evidence that the 
misbehaviour took place. To take a more scientific and less destructive 
example, the velocity of recession of a galaxy explains the redshift of its 
characteristic spectrum, even if the observation of that shift is an 
essential part of the scientist's evidence that the galaxy is indeed receding 
at that the specified velocity.” P. Lipton in (Hon & Rakover, 2013) p. 44-
5 
 
The scientific hypothesis concerning the velocity of recession of the galaxy is 
here self-evidencing. The hypothesis (that the velocity of recession is such-and 
–such) explains the redshift, and the observation of the redshift provides 
evidence of that very velocity of recession.  
 
Something similar may be claimed for PP/PEM. Thus Friston writes: 
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“I model myself as embodied in my environment and harvest sensory 
evidence for that model. If I am what I model, then confirmatory 
evidence will be available. If I am not, then I will experience things that 
are incompatible with my (hypothetical) existence. And, after a short 
period, will cease to exist in my present form” (K. Friston, 2011) p. 117 
 
Friston makes clear, however (K. Friston, 2011, 2013a, 2013b) that this talk of 
‘the model’ is meant to pick out the whole embodied agent. The whole 
embodied agent, then, is the full ‘model’ whose evidence is maximized by its 
own success (persistence). The generative model that is implemented by wiring 
and activity patterns in the brain is thus treated as contributing to, but by no 
means exhausting, the overall ‘embodied model’ that “distils and embodies 
causal structure in its local environment” p. 89). In this (slightly unusual) sense: 
 
“… an agent does not have a model of its world – it is a model. In other 
words, the form, structure, and states of our embodied brains do not 
contain a model of the sensorium– they are that model.” (K. Friston, 
2013a) p. 32 
 
This, I submit, is the primary locus for ‘self-evidencing’ in the PP/PEM story 
that: 
 
“takes the existence of agents as its starting point and concludes that 
each phenotype or agent embodies  an optimal model of its econiche” 
(K. Friston, 2011) p.89 
 
Hohwy, in the treatment of self-evidencing, fails to foreground this important 
wrinkle. In Hohwy’s treatment, it is the notion of the self-evidencing brain, 
rather than any notion of a self-evidencing embodied agent, that is supposed to 
impose the evidentiary curtain that ushers internalism back onto the cognitive 
arena.  Once look at the larger (fully embodied) story, things start to look rather 
different. 
 
To see this, notice that the PP/PEM accounts are often presented as 
manifestations of an even more general principle known as ‘free energy 
minimization’16. But the notions of inference and model, as they are used 
within this larger information-theoretic framework, are extremely weak. For 
example, (K. Friston, Levin, Sengupta, & Pezzulo, 2015) using the free energy 
framework to describe the way cells migrate and differentiate during 
embryogenesis, comment that: 
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“If each cell… minimizes variational free energy then it should, in 
principle, come to infer its unique place in the ensemble and behave 
accordingly. This is guaranteed because the minimum of variational free 
energy is obtained when each cell is in a unique location and has 
correctly inferred its place. At this point, it will express the appropriate 
signals and fulfil the predictions of all other cells; thereby, maximizing 
the evidence for its model of the ensemble (and minimizing the free 
energy of the ensemble” (K. Friston, Levin, et al., 2015) p.2, my 
emphases 
 
Whatever the use of the terms ‘infer’ and ‘model’ mean in these low-level free 
energy minimization accounts, they does not seem to imply the presence of 
inner models or content-bearing states of the kinds imagined in traditional 
cognitive science.  Instead, what are picked out seem to be physical processes 
defined over states that do not bear contents at all – neither richly 
reconstructive nor of any more ‘action-oriented’ kind17.  
 
How should we understand the notion of ‘self-evidencing’ in these kinds of 
case? Consider a very simple creature, such as a bacterium. Friston will say of 
such a creature that its very existence provides evidence for itself considered as 
an ‘embodied model’ of the organism-salient environment. This is because even 
in the case of the bacterium, its inner states “must entail a generative model of 
its world whose free energy is minimized by perception and action”. This is 
true, we are told “whether you are an E. coli or an evangelist. Because free-
energy is a function of sensations and internal states it is, in essence, an 
attribute of an embodied inference.” (both quotes from (K. Friston, 2011) 
p.117). 
 
In the E. Coli case there is thus self-evidencing aplenty. But this in no way 
detracts from the obvious fact that much that matters about the E. Coli is 
clearly ‘extra-neural’ and may crucially involve (for example) the placement, 
length, and flexibility of the motion-enabling flagellum. If we (as external 
theorists) wish to explain and understand the way in which E. Coli remains 
within its specialized window of viability, temporarily resisting the second law 
of thermodynamics, this suggest that we really do need to treat the whole 
embodied bacterium as the free–energy minimizing ‘model’. In that extended sense, 
bodily forms, sensors, sensor placements, and structures (just like gross 
neuroanatomical forms and structures – see (K. Friston, 2011) must be 
considered as parts of the ‘embodied model’ itself.  
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Let us accept that, as far as the brain itself is concerned, all the evidence it (the 
brain) ever gets is evidence mediated by perturbations of our sensory surfaces. 
We can now see that it does not follow that every change in the total free-
energy minimizing  ‘embodied model’  that  (in Friston’s extended sense) we are 
must be mediated by, or result in, any change in an inner model supported by the 
brain/CNS. The broader free energy story to which Hohwy appeals thus fails 
to support any strong conclusions concerning neuro-inferential seclusion. For 
the ‘model’ in question is not (not exclusively, and sometimes, as in the case of 
E. Coli, not at all) an inner content-bearing model bounded by activity at the 
sensory surfaces. Instead, the model is the whole embodied organism whose 
gross bodily forms and features are themselves free-energy minimizing devices.  
 
Interestingly, Hohwy himself repeatedly notices – and even stresses – the 
importance of the whole organism. But he does not mark it as complicating 
(perhaps even undermining) his own arguments for neurocentric seclusion. The 
reason, I suspect, turns once again upon perceived implications of the mere 
possibility of global skepticism. Thus Hohwy may reply that, from the 
creature’s own perspective, the world as it knows it must be fully specified by 
explicit processes of prediction error minimization applied to activity patterns 
at its sensory surfaces (as they occur against an evolving backdrop of priors and 
precision estimations). It is this, we are told, that requires us to embrace the 
bare possibility of global skepticism.  
 
I do not wish to enter into these hotly contested skeptical debates here (for my 
own take on such possibilities, see Clark (2005) and the discussion in Chalmers 
(2005), both of which appear in (Grau, 2005))18. But what should at least be 
clear is that the full free energy story depicts an agent-world relation that is far 
richer than any relation between explicit neurally realized inner models and the 
larger environment. The full agent–world relation foregrounded by the free 
energy accounts is in no way hermetically bounded by the agent’s own explicit neural 
constructs. The mere possibility that we may be deeply and permanently misled 
about our apparent surroundings is thus orthogonal to the real question before 
us, which concerns the most likely shape of the actual mind-world relation, 
assuming the existence of the creature and the truth of the PP/free energy 
framework. 
 
To sum up, the argument from the self-evidencing brain trades, I suggest, upon 
another ambiguity - one that is very closely related to that explored in the 
previous section. This time, it is the ambiguity between the common notion of 
inner models and a much broader sense of ‘model’, sometimes flagged by talk 
of ‘the embodied model’. In the more restricted sense, what matters (for 
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understanding mind and intelligent, adaptive response) is only the ways sensory 
inputs impact an articulated inner model. But in the broader sense, whole 
embodied agents are the models and ‘free energy’ is minimized by all manner of 
adaptive tricks and ploys. These may (but need not) include the use of complex 
explicit inner models. But they also include the use of very simple inner models, 
facts about sensor-types, gross morphology, sensor placement, and the very 
materials of which the organism is built. This means that it is not brains (or 
brain-based inner models) but whole embodied agents that are, in the relevant 
sense, self-evidencing19.  
 
7. Efficiency: A Dilemma for the Neurocentric Vision 
 
So far, our discussion has been mostly negative. Nothing in the PEM story, so 
the argument goes, should force us to accept a secluded, neurocentric vision in 
which inner constructs do all the heavy lifting. It is now time to think more 
positively and explore an alternative account. That account depicts predictive 
processing as a thoroughly dynamical story that highlights self-organization and 
complex brain-body-world interactions, and that thus provides the perfect 
partner for work on embodied, extended and enactive cognition.  
 
The key concept here is efficiency. Efficiency (see e.g. Barlow (1959), 
(Olshausen & Field, 1996)) is intuitively the opposite of redundancy and excess. 
A representational scheme is efficient if it uses only the minimal resources 
necessary to capture the regularities that matter for driving behavior. In general, 
this means finding a model that, when confronted with new sensory data, need 
only update a few parameters to account for (to ‘explain away’) the gross 
sensory signal. A model that is rich enough to capture the regularities important 
for selecting behavior, but that requires alterations to very few of its critical 
states to explain the sensory signal, has low complexity in this sense. Such 
models provide what ((Hobson & Friston, 2014) p.23) describe as “accurate 
but parsimonious explanations for sensations”. The goal of the predictive brain, 
in other words, is to command models that track organism-salient patterns 
without relying upon more parameters than are positively required to do the 
job.  Systems that fit data accurately (using the minimum number of 
parameters) are efficient modelers of their world. A system that uses a large 
number of parameters to explain the same data is not a ‘more accurate’ modeler 
of its world. On the contrary, the result will often be ‘over-fitting’ of the model 
to the observed data, some of which turns out to be merely ‘noise’ or random 
fluctuations rather than informative signal. This is nicely dramatized in 
Feldman’s (2013) p.15) discussion of the ‘Lord’s Prior” where this rather 
mischievously names the misleading idea (roundly rejected by Feldman) that 
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“the optimal Bayesian observer is correctly tuned when its priors match those 
objectively in force in the environment”.  
 
The deepest problems with such a notion emerge as soon as we reflect that 
active agents are not, at root, simply trying to model the data so much as to 
come up with recipes for choosing which data to sample next - recipes for 
acting appropriately in the world. The Optical Acceleration Cancellation 
procedure described in section 3 provides a nice example, since it combines 
low complexity (few parameters) with high behavioral leverage. Commenting 
on the OAC model, Anderson writes that: 
 
“It is important to underline how big a blow this apparently simple 
finding is for the traditional view. In order to solve this fairly complex 
perception-action coordination problem, people do not appear to be 
reconstructing or otherwise representing the flight path of the ball, nor 
generating predictive hypotheses. Instead they are acting continuously in 
real time so as to achieve a particular perception.” (M L Anderson, 2014) 
p.185 
 
Anderson clearly takes the OAC strategy to be representative of a large and 
rich space of alternatives to traditional views that involve complex ‘epistemic 
mediators’. And it is easy to see what he is getting at. For a system using the 
OAC strategy is not engaging in a process of inner reconstruction whose goal is 
to enable the organism to solve the problem ‘from the inside’, merely by 
operating upon a rich suite of inner encodings. Instead, this is a problem 
solution that requires (all those marginal skeptical possibilities notwithstanding) 
behavior to unfold courtesy of close couplings between body and world – 
couplings that the brain maintains by the simple device of ensuring that the 
flow of sensation remains within certain bounds. Action is here the control of 
perception, and perception is not about building up a rich inner model but 
about maintaining the rolling perception-action cycle that solves the problem.  
 
Anderson claims that the brain, within this unfolding cycle, is not ‘generating 
predictive hypotheses’. But Hohwy, as we saw earlier, expressly endorses the 
view that even in cases such as these, the PP/PEM story applies. Hohwy is 
right. The relevant distinction is not between the presence or absence of a 
strategy rooted in neural prediction (and the resolution of neural prediction 
error). For the OAC strategy is easily implemented using prediction error 
minimizing techniques – simply treat as salient (highly weighted) all and only 
the prediction errors associated with optical acceleration of the ball. Cancelling 
those errors by action is, in fact, an excellent example of an action-based 
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PP/PEM strategy – the kind of strategy that should be favored by the 
considerations of efficiency and minimal modeling just noted20.  
 
Anderson is right, however, to stress the epistemic radicalism of the OAC story. 
For OAC-style solutions are, just as Anderson insists, deeply non-
reconstructive. They are ‘grip-based’ stories that undermine the traditional 
vision according to which cognition is accomplished by operations defined 
over a kind of picture-perfect inner recapitulation of the external world. By 
stressing coupled unfoldings and action as the control of perception, such 
stories reveal cognition as a world-engaged, action-oriented process. Such 
accounts stand opposed to visions of epistemic isolation.  
 
The upshot is a kind of dilemma for Howhy’s defense of the neurocentric 
vision. For Hohwy, as we have seen, wants to combine a staunchly ‘non-
intellectualist’ reading of PP/PEM with much more conservative claims 
concerning epistemic insulation. But this is not a consistent combination. 
Hohwy’s vision of epistemic isolation would follow only if predictive brains 
calculated behavioral responses using richly reconstructive inner models. To be 
sure, some critics of the predictive vision (such as (Michael L Anderson & 
Chemero, 2013) mistakenly identify genuinely prediction-based accounts with 
either symbolic-inferential or richly reconstructive approaches21. Hohwy, by 
contrast, clearly believes that PP/PEM accounts easily encompass the kinds of 
efficient and elegant solution familiar from work in embodied cognitive science. 
This is correct. But that means it is not, by any stretch of the imagination,  an 
isolationist brain-bound treatment. Instead it is one that places coupled 
unfoldings, the active embodied agent, and the enabling environment centre-
stage. The vision of neurocentric isolation is thus incompatible with Hohwy’s 
careful and important recognition of the wide range of non-reconstructive 
solutions implied by work on the predictive brain. 
 
8. Transient Extended Cognitive Systems 
 
The PEM/PP framework, with its deep commitment to efficiency in neural 
processing, has the potential to illuminate large swathes of work in embodied 
cognitive science. But to fully appreciate that potential we must first notice 
another key ingredient in the predictive processing economy. That ingredient is 
the capacity to deliver moment-by-moment reconfigurations of patterns of 
‘effective connectivity’ within the brain.  
 
To see how this works, consider first that (within the PP/PEM framework) 
first-order probabilistic expectations are intertwined with context-varying 
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assessments of the reliability and salience of different bodies of information. 
These second-order estimations of reliability and salience determine the 
weighting (or ‘precision’) given to different aspects of the prediction error 
signal at different levels of processing. The primary effect of this is to 
systematically vary the relative influence of top-down versus bottom-up 
information by increasing the gain (intuitively, increasing the ‘volume’) on 
selected error units. This enables the well-calibrated perceiver to rely more on 
the sensory evidence when conditions are favorable, and to allow top-down 
expectations to play a larger role when the sensory signal is noisy or 
compromised. It also allows for greater reliance on select modalities (or more 
specific aspects of the sensory signal) according to variations in context and 
task demand. Precision estimations thus provide a powerful and delicate tool 
for putting stored knowledge to use in ways that vary with task and context. 
What this really amounts to is something quite spectacular. For variable 
precision-weightings are thus sculpting the patterns of ‘effective connectivity’ 
that vary internal (and thus, as we’ll next see, external) flows of influence and 
information according to task and context22.  
 
With these tools in hand, let’s revisit the outfielder’s problem described earlier. 
In such a cases, active neural predictions and simple, rapidly-processed 
perceptual cues work together to select a pattern of precision-weightings for 
different prediction error signals. This creates a transient web of effective 
connectivity (a simple, temporary, distributed circuit or what Anderson (2014 p. 
94) dubs a TALoN – Transiently Assembled Local Neural Subsystem) and, 
within that circuit, sets the balance between top-down and bottom-up modes 
of influence. The temporary task of visual sensing, in this context, becomes 
that of cancelling the optical acceleration of the fly ball (hence giving high 
weighting to prediction errors associated with cancelling the vertical 
acceleration of the ball’s optical projection). In this way, apt precision 
weightings select a pre-learnt, fast, low-cost strategy for solving the problem. 
Contextually recruited patterns of precision weighting thus accomplish a form 
of set-selection or strategy switching – an effect that has been practically 
demonstrated in some simple simulations of cued reaching (K. J. Friston et al., 
2012)). 
 
 Such solutions assume that slower processes of learning and adaptive plasticity 
have already sculpted patterns of neural connectivity in ways that make the 
low-cost (e.g. Optical Acceleration Cancellation) strategy available. But this is 
unproblematic. It can be motivated in general terms by the drive towards 
energetic efficiency, and implemented using processes of prediction error 
minimization at many time-scales. Such processes range all the way from the 
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slow learning of the child baseball player, to the faster online adaptation of the 
pro-player factoring in (during a match) the changing specifics of wind 
conditions and the play of opposing batters. The upshot will be a highly tuned 
system in which multi-scale predictive learning and rapidly-recruited patterns of 
precision-weighting conspire to control changing patterns of effective 
connectivity – in this case, making available a fast, low-cost strategy for solving 
the problem.  
 
Putting all this together yields a complex but rewarding picture in which 
bedrock processes of predictive learning slowly install models that include 
precision expectations allowing patterns of effective connectivity to be selected 
‘on the fly’. Such patterns in turn allow fast, knowledge-sparse modes of 
response to be recruited and nuanced according to current context. But more 
complex (intuitively more inferential and  ‘model-rich’) strategies may also 
involve simplifications and approximations. A nice example is work by 
(Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013) on ‘intuitive physics’. Human agents 
are able to make rapid inferences about the physical behavior of ordinary 
objects. Such inferences might include spotting that the pile of books or 
washing-up is unstable and at risk of toppling over, or that a lightly brushed 
object is going to fall and hit some other object. Underlying that capacity, 
Battaglia et al suggest, may be a probabilistic scene simulator (a probabilistic 
generative model) able to deliver rapid verdicts on the basis of partial, noisy 
information. Such a simulator does not rely upon propositional rules but rather 
upon “quantitative aspects and uncertainties of object’s geometry, motions, and 
force dynamics” (op cit p.18327). Approximate solutions such as these reflect 
what Gershman & Daw (2011, p.307)  describe as a kind of “meta-optimization 
over the costs (e.g. extra computation) of maintaining [a] full representation 
relative to its benefits”. The deepest explanation for the neural intermingling of 
perception, action, and utility may, Gershman and Daw (op cit, p.308) suggest, 
lie right there, in adaptive pressure to find and deploy representational forms 
and statistical approximations that “concentrate their density in regions of high 
utility”. The upshot is a kind of meta-Bayesian determination of what to 
represent, and of when, and how, to represent it. Meta-Bayesian agents like this 
will use the most efficient strategy that is good enough to do the job, and that 
is currently available within the reconfigurable flow. Dealing with a complex 
time-pressured world thus demands the use of many strategies, ranging from 
very simple heuristics to more complex structures of interacting 
approximations. That diverse landscape may, however, form part of an 
overarching uncertainty-based cognitive eco-system – an eco-system within 
which these many strategies emerge, dissolve, and interact. The PP/PEM 
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architecture is thus dynamically self-reconfiguring, constantly engaging actions 
that yield new inputs that recruit new strategies in a kind of rolling cycle.  
 
Such architectures are ideally positioned to support the kinds of ‘motor-
informational weave’ highlighted in section 4 above. To see this, reflect that 
known external (e.g. environmental) operations provide – by partly constituting 
-  additional strategies apt for the kind of ‘meta-model-based’ selection just 
described. This is because actions that engage and exploit specific external 
resources will now be selected in just the same manner as the inner coalitions 
of neural resources themselves. For example, consider the case where salient 
high-precision information is available by the use of some bio-external device, 
such as a laptop or smartphone. The core routine that selects actions to reduce 
prediction error will now select actions that invoke the bio-external resource. 
Invoking a bio-external resource, and moving our own effectors and sensors to 
yield high-quality task-relevant information, are here expressions of the very 
same underlying strategy: one that reflects our brain’s best (sub-personal) 
estimates of where and when reliable, task-relevant information is available.  
 
As a further illustration, consider work by (Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Chersi, 2013). 
Here, a so-called ‘Mixed Instrumental Controller’ determines whether to 
choose an action based upon a set of simple, pre-computed (‘cached’) values, 
or by running a mental simulation enabling a more flexible, model-based 
assessment of the desirability, or otherwise, of actually performing the action. 
The mixed controller computes the ‘value of information’ selecting the more 
informative (but costly) model-based option only when that value is sufficiently 
high. Mental simulation, in those cases, then produces new reward expectancies 
that can determine current action by updating the values used to determine 
choice.  We can think of this as a mechanism that, moment-by-moment, 
determines whether to exploit simple, already-cached routines or to explore a 
richer set of possibilities using some form of mental simulation.  It is easy to 
imagine a version of the mixed controller that determines (on the basis of past 
experience) the value of the information that it believes would be made 
available by some kind of cognitive extension, such as the manipulation of an 
abacus, a smartphone, or a physical model. Deciding when to rest content with 
a simple cached strategy, when to deploy a more costly mental simulation, and 
when to exploit the environment itself as a cognitive resource are thus all 
options apt for the same kind of ‘meta-Bayesian’ model-based resolution. 
 
Seen from this perspective, the selection of task-specific inner neural coalitions 
within an interaction-dominated PP economy is entirely on a par with the 
selection of task-specific neural-bodily-worldly ensembles. PP thus delivers a 
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perfect fit with the vision of the brain as a dynamical engine whose key role is 
to initiate and maintain valuable patterns of embodied interaction (‘grip’) with a 
richly structured environment. This, of course, is precisely the radical vision of 
the embodied mind that Hohwy depicts PP as opposing. It is the vision 
championed, for example, in Anderson (2014), who summarizes is as implying 
that: 
 
“the brain is fundamentally action-oriented, and specializes in managing 
the organism’s interactions with the world; and….the brain achieves its 
functions by assembling the right functional coalitions between both 
neural and extra-neural partners, including supporting interaction with 
external artifacts including symbolic ones—for cognitive ends.” 
Anderson (2014) p. 302 
 
The recruitment and use of extended (brain-body-world) problem-solving 
ensembles now turns out to obey many of the same basic rules, and reflects 
many of the same basic normative principles (balancing efficacy and efficiency, 
and reflecting complex precision estimations) as does the recruitment of 
temporary inner coalitions bound by effective connectivity. In each case, what is 
selected is a temporary problem-solving ensemble (a transient extended 
cognitive system (Clark (2008)) or  ‘task-specific device’ (Bingham, 1988) 
recruited as a function of context-varying estimations of uncertainty23. Such 
temporary ensembles emerge and are deployed within iterated cycles in which 
perceptuo-motor routines deliver new inputs that recruit new transient 
ensembles of resources. It is these rolling cycles that most clearly characterize 
human cognition in the wild. Within such cycles, arbitrarily complex amounts 
of ‘leaning on the world’ may become progressively folded in, expanding our 
practical cognitive capacities by offloading work from brain to (non-neural) 
body, and from organism to (physical, social, and technological) world. What 
PP makes unusually clear is that it is these rolling cycles that the neural 
economy constantly (and not just in the special cases involving mind-extending 
tools and technologies) serves. As these complex engagements unfold, no inner 
homunculus oversees the repeated soft-assembly of the distributed problem-
solving ensembles that result.  Instead, such ensembles emerge and dissolve in 
ways determined by the progressive reduction of precise, high-quality, 
prediction error. Organismically salient (high precision) prediction error may 
thus be the glue that, via its expressions in action, binds elements from brain, 
body, and world into temporary problem-solving wholes. 
 
9.  Conclusions: Prediction-Based Intermingling 
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Work on embodied, extended, and enactive cognition can seem to point in a 
rather different direction to work on the predictive brain. The perceived 
conflict is, however, illusory.  Once we consider the role of prediction in the 
genesis and unfolding of action, the picture alters dramatically. For predictive 
processing results in the creation and deployment of ‘pragmatic action-oriented 
representations’: inner states tailored to the production of good online control 
rather than aiming for rich reconstructive mirroring of some action-
independent world. Instead, neural processing delivers a grip upon a world of 
possibilities for action and intervention. Perception delivers a world parsed for 
action, while action harvests the perceptual flows that secure both epistemic 
and practical success24. 
 
Predictive processing’s full resonance with work in embodied cognition can 
only be appreciated, however, once an additional ingredient is brought into play. 
That ingredient is the capacity to use variable ‘precision weighting’ to sculpt 
patterns of effective connectivity within the brain, thereby selecting actions that 
recruit the simplest brain-body-world circuits that can reliably support a target 
behavior. This neatly accommodates frugal ‘sensing-for-coupling’-style 
solutions of the kind celebrated by work in ecological psychology.  But better 
still, it accommodates those solutions within the systematic and empowering 
context of a fluid, re-configurable economy in which the use of rich, 
knowledge-based strategies and the use of fast, frugal procedures are merely 
different expressions of a common uncertainty-estimating mechanism. Thanks 
to that mechanism, changing ensembles of inner and outer resources are 
repeatedly recruited, forming and dissolving in ways determined by external 
context, current needs, and ongoing (sub-personal) estimations of our own 
uncertainty. The threat of neurocentric seclusion is thus fully and satisfyingly 
averted. What remains is a vision of dense, but fluid, intermingling in which 
brain, body, and environment appear as  “mutually embedded systems” 
(Thompson & Varela, 2001 p.423 ) harmonized in the service of situated 
success.  
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morphology. Such systems are already well on the road to knowing their own bodies and worlds. For 
important work on how minimal early biases can guide learning, see Elman (2005), Carey (2009). 
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Friston and collaborators summarized in Friston (2009) and (2010). For comprehensive reviews, see 
Hohwy (2013), Clark (2013), and (with a somewhat different focus) Hinton (2007) and Huang and 
Rao (2011). 
 
5 The term ‘predictive processing’ (PP) is used by Clark (2013), and ‘prediction error minimizing’ 
(PEM) by Hohwy (2013). In what follows, I shall stick with PP, but the reader may substitute these 
for one another at will. 
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6 For reviews, see Kveraga et al (2007), Bubic et al (2010), Hohwy (2013), Clark (2013), Clark (2016)) 
 
7 For some nice simulation studies displaying the power of such active interrogations, see Friston, 
Adams, Perrinet, and Breakspear (2012), who describe visual search as a form of hypothesis-testing 
experiment. As long as no hurdles (prediction error signals) are encountered, the current hypothesis 
remains in place. But that hypothesis is continually put the test. Here, as elsewhere, the epistemology 
of predictive processing is reminiscent of the falsificationist agenda associated with Karl Popper – 
see e.g. (Popper, 1963/2002). 
 
8 See Ballard (1991), Churchland et al (1994), Warren (2006), Anderson (2014) pp 163-172.  
 
9 Thus Hohwy et al (2008) note that “Terms like ‘predictions’ and ‘hypotheses’ sound rather 
intellectualist when it comes to basic perceptual inference. But at its heart the only processing aim of 
the system is simply to minimize prediction error or free energy, and indeed, the talk of hypotheses 
and predictions can be translated into such a less anthropomorphic framework [and] implemented 
using relatively simple neuronal infrastructures.” (Hohwy et al. 2008, pp. 688–690) 
 
10 One might, in fact, deny that evil demon style manipulations actually deceive us. Instead, they 
might merely create an alternate substrate for the same old veridical knowledge about an external 
reality built of tables, chairs, baseball games and the like. For this kind of response, see Chalmers 
(2005). Alternatively, one might espouse a disjunctivist view of the contents of perceptual experience 
(for discussion, see the essays in Haddock and Macpherson 2008). 
 
11  This does bear in one way on the skeptical challenge. For when perception plays a non-
reconstructive role, as Anderson (op cit p.185) notes “There is no need to posit any further epistemic 
mediators… to characterize the nature of [the] perception-action coupling.”  
 
12 Typically, these rich inner models involved symbolic encodings that described states of affairs 
using complex language-like knowledge structures. Nothing like this is implied by PEM. 
 
13 For a thorough rehearsal of the positive arguments, see Clark (2008). For critiques, see Rupert 
(2004) (2009), (Adams & Aizawa (2008). For a rich sampling of the ongoing debate, see the essays in 
Menary (2010).  
 
14 Similarly, when we solve a mathematical puzzle with pen and paper, we do not need to represent 
all the details in our heads – instead, we rely on the properties of the external medium to bear some 
of the problem-solving load.  
 
15 Such considerations are not, in themselves, sufficient to establish the truth of the extended mind 
hypothesis (for such an argument, the reader is referred to Clark (2008)). But they do suggest that 
there is ample space for such a story within the PP/PEM vision of the contribution of the biological 
brain. 
 
16 Free-energy formulations originate in statistical physics and were introduced into the machine-
learning literature in seminal treatments that include Hinton and von Camp (1993), Hinton and 
Zemel (1994), MacKay (1995), and Neal and Hinton (1998). Such formulations can arguably be used 
(e.g., Friston, 2010) to display the prediction error minimization strategy as itself a manifestation of a 
more fundamental mandate to minimize an information-theoretic isomorph of thermodynamic free 
energy in a system’s exchanges with the environment.  
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17 This deeper ambivalence in the notion of inference is nicely captured by Bruineberg and Rietveld 
who note that “within philosophy and cognitive science the notion of “inference” is traditionally 
understood in terms of arriving at a propositional statement based on some premises or observations. 
Within the Free Energy framework the notion of “inference” is much more minimal and does not 
involve any propositions: any dynamical system A coupled with another B can be said to “infer” the 
“hidden cause” of its “input” (the dynamics of B) when it reliably covaries with the dynamics of B 
and it is robust to the noise inherent in the coupling” Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014, p.7) 	  
18 In essence, I would opt here for a broadly pragmatist response. The goodness of our bedrock 
worldly understanding, I would argue, is simply constituted by the way it enables ongoing 
perception/action loops to succeed. Such a view leaves no room for what Hohwy (2014, p. 5) 
describes as a ‘schism’ between prediction-generating neural models and modeled states of the world. 
For (bracketing the special contexts set up by scientific practice – there is a whole other discussion to 
be had thereabouts) our neural models are not meant to be descriptions of an agent-independent 
world. Rather, they are recipes for engaging that world. They are recipes, moreover, that can rely 
heavily upon the reliable contributions of bodily and environmental factors and forces. This offers 
some levers for thinking about the ‘extended mind’, as we see in section 5. 
 
19 This implies – just as Hohwy and Friston insist – that any viable agent, in its many exchanges with 
the world, maximizes the sensory evidence for the model that it (in this extended sense) embodies. 
We already saw (section 3) that this should not be taken as evidence for the use of a fully 
reconstructive inner model. Similarly, we now see that the notion of self-evidencing does not impose 
a sensation-based veil that screens off the extra-neural world.  
 
20 Efficiency and the use of minimal models are implied by the free energy principle, insofar as 
securing behavioral success at minimal energetic cost is simply part and parcel of organismic 
resistance to the second law of thermodynamics. 
 
21 Such a view would be suggested if, for example, one were to identify the PEM story with earlier 
perception-driven  treatments such as Gregory (1980). 
 22	  ‘Effective connectivity’ (see Aertsen et al., (1987), (Friston (1995), Horwitz (2003), Sporns (2010)) 
names ‘the influence one neural system exerts over another’ ((K. J. Friston, 1994) p. 57). It is to be 
distinguished from both structural and functional connectivity.  ‘Structural connectivity’ names the 
gross pattern of physical linkages (the web of fibers and synapses) that allow neurons to interact 
across space and time. ‘Functional connectivity’ describes observed patterns of temporal correlation 
between neural events. The closely related notion of ‘effective connectivity’  reflects short-term 
patterns of causal influence between neural events, taking us beyond simple observations of 
undirected – and sometimes uninformative - correlation.  	  
23 For more on such transient ensembles, see Anderson, Richardson, and Chemero (2012), Anderson 
(2014). 
 
24 For a lovely exploration of these two roles for action, and their fluid emergence from a predictive 
processing architecture, see Friston, Rigoli, et al. (2015). 
